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Chapter 5 of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act strives to achieve two objectives. It makes post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) 
accessible to victims of sexual assault, whether a charge is laid or not. In addition, it allows for the victim or the investigating officer to 
make application for the forcible disclosure of the HIV status of the accused, within 90 days of the assault. It is argued that the provision 
of PEP to victims of sexual assault is required by section 27(1) of the Constitution, and is an obligation that the state should assume and 
discharge efficiently and ably. However, it is considered that the provisions compelling the accused to disclosure his HIV status to the 
victim and investigating officer serve no medical purpose, and seriously infringe a number of important constitutional rights. The authors 
go on to argue that a magistrate has to be satisfied that a prima facie case has been made that the accused sexually assaulted the 
victim before compelling disclosure. Given the seriousness of this finding, it is very likely to be robustly contested by the accused and 
consequently victims may have to testify twice, initially at these proceedings and subsequently at the criminal proceedings. They argue 
that the medical, legal and support services provided to the victim should be upgraded and improved. The authors identify some clinics 
that are operating with reasonable efficiency. They argue that the simplistic solution of compelling the accused to disclose his HIV status 
is aimed at making up for the inadequacies of policing and the inability to prosecute effectively. They also submit that the test results 
may bring false hope and result in poor choices being made regarding treatment. They submit that the testing provisions may not be 
in the medical best interests of the patient and the provisions are not reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society and 
consequently unconstitutional.
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Recently there has been mounting public concern and pressure 
on the authorities to take appropriate action with regard to the 
deliberate transmission of HIV infection.1 This has to be seen 
against the backdrop of the alarmingly high levels of sexual crimes 
against women and children in South Africa.2,3 The high HIV 
seroprevalence in the country further compounds the problem. 
In 2009, the SAPS recorded 68 332 rape victims reporting rape,2 
and the general consensus is that large numbers of rape cases 
go unreported.4 In 2009 approximately 5.6 million people were 
estimated to be living with HIV infection,3 with 17.3% of the adult 
population affected, 25% (1.1 - 1.6 million people) with symptomatic 
HIV infection, and 7% (360 000) with full-blown AIDS.3 The inability 
to deal with the scourge of sexual violence against women and 
the high levels of HIV seroprevalence in the country mean that 
women who are raped are at risk of contracting HIV. The issue, 
however, is how do we deal with this reality? Parliament sought to 
address the issue by including a number of measures in Chapter 
5 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (the Act).5 In lieu of this, the purpose 
of this article is to assess the efficacy of these measures from a 
medical perspective, and to determine their constitutionality from 
a legal perspective.
The South African Law Commission (SALC), at the request of 
the Justice and Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee, was 
tasked with investigating the creation of a statutory offence aimed 
at harmful HIV-related behaviour, and the compulsory testing of 
sexual offenders for HIV.5 The SALC prepared two discussion 
papers. Discussion Paper 80 dealt with the issue of harmful 
behaviour by persons with HIV/AIDS.6 Further to this, Discussion 
Paper 847 dealt with the question of compulsory HIV testing of 
persons arrested on a charge or on suspicion of having committed 
a sexual offence, and the right of the alleged victims of such 
offences to be informed of the HIV test result.7 In general, the 
debates have focused on the following issues:5
• the high prevalence of HIV, coupled with the high prevalence 
of rape and other sexual offences in the country
• the utility and limitations of HIV testing
• women’s international and constitutional rights, and
• the arrested person’s constitutional rights.
The preliminary conclusion of the Project Committee on HIV/
AIDS is that there was a need for statutory intervention5 in the 
light of the vulnerability of women and children to widespread 
sexual violence in South Africa.2-4 This occurs in the context of the 
increasing prevalence of a nationwide epidemic of HIV infection,3 
and in the absence of adequate institutional or other victim-support 
measures.6,7 
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In these circumstances, the Project Committee concluded that 
there was a compelling argument for curtailing an accused 
person’s rights of privacy and bodily integrity to a limited extent 
to enable his/her accuser to know whether he/she has HIV or any 
other life-threatening sexually transmissible infection (STI). The 
Project Committee concluded that knowledge of the accused’s 
HIV status enables the victim to make life decisions and choices 
for him/herself and the people around him/her. Furthermore, this 
information would be profoundly beneficial to his/her psychological 
state, as it provides a degree of certainty regarding his/her 
exposure to a life-threatening disease.5 This, according to the 
Project Committee, justified the infringement of the rights of the 
accused.5
A description of chapter 5 of the Act8
Chapter 5 of the Act has two distinct objectives. It provides that 
the victims may receive post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP)1, and it 
allows for compulsory HIV testing of the alleged sex offenders. 
Various safeguards are built into the process, and the test results 
may only be used for purposes stipulated in the Act. Section 28 of 
the Act provides that a victim who has been exposed to the risk of 
being infected with HIV as a result of a sexual offence having been 
committed against him or her may receive PEP to prevent HIV 
infection, at state expense.9 These free services are only provided 
to victims who either lay a charge with the SAPS, or report the 
incident to a designated health establishment (i.e. rape trauma 
rooms or crisis centres) within 72 hours of the alleged sexual 
offence having occurred.10 It is important to note that a victim who 
presents to a designated health institution is not obliged to lay a 
charge in order to obtain PEP, provided they present within 72 hours 
and baseline rapid-test HIV testing is negative.9 This is a positive 
measure, which will have the effect of curbing the transmission of 
the virus where a sexual offence has been committed.11 
Much more controversially, the chapter goes on to provide for 
applications to be made, either by the victim12 or by the investigating 
officer, for compulsory HIV testing of the alleged offender.13 Either 
the victim, or someone on behalf of the victim, may within 90 
days apply to a magistrate for the alleged offender to be tested 
for HIV, and for the results to be disclosed to the victim or the 
interested person. The application must be made after a charge 
has been laid. The victim must state that a sexual offence has 
been committed against him or her by the offender, that it has been 
reported, and that the victim is exposed to the risk of being infected 
with HIV. The magistrate is required to consider the application in 
chambers, and may consider evidence on behalf of the accused, if 
to do so would not give rise to a substantial delay. If the magistrate 
is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence that a sexual offence 
has been committed by the alleged offender against the victim, 
that the victim has been exposed to bodily fluids and that not more 
than 90 days has elapsed since the date of the alleged offence,14 
the magistrate may make an order for the alleged offender to be 
tested. The results can then be disclosed to the victim and to the 
alleged offender.
Section 34 of the Act provides that the results may be used to 
enable the victim to make informed medical choices, and in civil 
proceedings that may be instituted against the alleged offender. 
Furthermore, the results can be used by the investigating officer 
to gather information, in order to build a case against the accused 
in criminal proceedings. Finally, section 37 seeks to protect the 
confidentiality of the information and section 38 makes it an offence 
for any person to lay a charge with the objective of ascertaining a 
person’s HIV status.
The issue, then, is whether the proverbial baby is thrown out with 
the bathwater as a consequence of these processes. We submit 
that the Act contains provisions that may be unconstitutional, and 
may be contrary to the medical best interests of the victim. The 
HIV status of the alleged perpetrator has no material consequence 
to the medical or legal outcomes for the victim, and could in fact 
further traumatise the victim. An acquittal in the subsequent trial 
could open the possibility of charges being laid in terms of the Act 
by the accused person, alleging that the information was obtained 
with malicious intent.15 
The constitutional right of access to 
health care services16
Section 27(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the 
right of access to health care services, and there is an obligation on 
the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures within 
available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of these 
rights.17 This is the formula that the Constitution uses in respect 
of the cluster of socio-economic rights that are protected in the 
Constitution. As the jurisprudence has developed, the key issue 
is how the courts enforce socio-economic rights such as the right 
of access to health care, without unconstitutionally trespassing 
on the policy-making and implementation responsibilities of the 
executive.
The test as far as justiciability of socio-economic rights is 
concerned, is one of reasonableness.17 The advantage of this test 
is that it requires a clear exposition and justification by government 
for its policy choices, without being unduly rigid and prescriptive. 
The Constitutional Court (CC) in Grootboom, indicated that in 
determining whether governmental action is reasonable in terms 
of section 26(2) of the Constitution, a court will not enquire into 
whether different and more favourable measures could have been 
adopted. The reasonableness enquiry recognises that a wide range 
of options may be adopted by the state to meet its objectives.17 
One of the recurring themes in the judgments of the CC is that if 
governmental measures are to be deemed reasonable, they must 
cater for those most in need and whose rights are most in peril.18 
There must be a demonstration that the most marginalised and 
vulnerable in the society are being assisted by the government 
measure. A comprehensive housing policy was therefore held to 
be unreasonable in Grootboom, because no provision was made 
to alleviate the plight and conditions of those in great need and who 
were on waiting lists for formal housing. They were simply left to 
their own devices, with no assistance from the state, and this was 
untenable. Similarly, in the Treatment Action Campaign case,19 
the court held that the government policy of restricting the use of 
nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission to certain test 
sites was unreasonable. The net effect of the policy was that those 
who were entirely dependent on the state for health care were being 
denied access to the drug that could potentially prevent mother-to-
child transmission if they attended public hospitals outside the test 
sites. The drug was being offered free of charge to the state for a 
certain period, and the court concluded that the reasons for not 
making the drug available in all state hospitals when its use was 
sanctioned by the attending physician was unreasonable. Once 
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again, the most marginalised and disempowered in society were 
worst affected by the policy. The state was ordered to change its 
policy and bring it into line with the Constitution.
In both Grootboom and the TAC cases, the court set aside the 
policies, and taking cognisance of the separation of powers allowed 
government to reformulate the policies in a manner that complied 
with its constitutional obligations. Finally, the CC in Mazibuko20 
provided further guidance on how to evaluate the reasonableness 
or otherwise of measures adopted by government. The court 
declined to grant an order obliging government to provide a 
minimum of 50 litres of free water per person per day in the Phiri 
area of Soweto. Such an order would, in the opinion of the court, 
have been unduly prescriptive and may have had the effect of 
hampering government in the proper and systematic realisation 
of all socio-economic rights. The court21 held that government 
policies would be unreasonable if they made no provision for 
those desperately in need, if government adopted a policy with 
unreasonable limitations and exclusions, and if government did 
not continually review its policy to ensure that the achievement 
of rights was being progressively realised. In this case, the court 
held that the policy of providing 25 litres of free water, together with 
various other options including installing prepaid water meters, 
was not unreasonable. A factor that weighed heavily with the court 
was that indigent persons could apply for a further and additional 
supply of free water. Importantly, government provided a full and 
comprehensive explanation for its policy choices.
As a consequence of the jurisprudence on the socio-economic 
rights, government is required to progressively realise the right 
of access to health care. In terms of section 4(3) of the National 
Health Care Act 2003, the state, clinics and community health 
centres funded by the state must provide free health care services 
to pregnant and lactating women and children below the age of 
6 years, who are not members or beneficiaries of medical aid 
schemes. Further free primary health care must be provided to 
all persons, except members of medical aid schemes and their 
dependants and persons receiving compensation for compensable 
occupational diseases. In addition, women must be provided with 
free termination of pregnancy services, subject to the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, No 92 of 1996. To this list must now 
be added free PEP to the victims of sexual assaults. 
Given the high prevalence of HIV in our society, the alarming 
number of sexual offences being committed, the efficacy of 
preventing transmission if victims are put on PEP treatment 
immediately, the long-term cost savings and cost-effectiveness of 
this treatment, and the low numbers of people on private medical 
insurance, the government would have been acting unreasonably 
had PEP not been made available free of charge in state hospitals 
and clinics – to victims. The issue is whether, having made this 
treatment available to all victims, is it reasonable and justifiable to 
compel the alleged offender to reveal his status? 
Impact on the survivor
We acknowledge that the forced disclosure provisions in the 
Act may have the effect of reducing trauma and empowering 
some victims to make informed medical and other personal 
decisions. The term ‘victim’ is used, as this is the terminology of 
the Act. However, it is preferable to refer to survivors, as it is a 
more empowering and affirming term. It may also have negative 
implications for other victims. At the moment, emergency medical 
services, including PEP, antiretroviral drugs, and ongoing 
counselling are available in terms of the National Department of 
Health Protocols on Management of a Rape Survivor/Child Sex 
Abuse.22 There are a number of ‘one-stop’ crisis centres operating 
on a 24-hour basis. These are staffed by trained clinical forensic 
officers and clinical forensic nurses, and in addition a SAPS desk 
is present at these facilities. In KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) this model is 
working well at Addington, Mahatma Gandhi (MGH), and Prince 
Mshyeni (PMMH) hospitals. However, the service needs to be 
expanded into the peri-urban and rural areas of KZN.
Addington, MGH and PMMH are 24-hour walk-in crisis centres. 
They are staffed by trained clinical forensic nurses and district 
medical officers (previously known as district surgeons). A 
rape victim can walk into these centres, which afford privacy, 
confidentiality and professionalism in terms of trained staff 
conducting a medical examination, evidentiary collection using 
the Sexual Assault Collection Kit, medico-legal documentation, 
and PEP inclusive of counselling. The patient, after discussion 
with the professional staff, may elect to report or not report the 
case. The patient’s autonomy is respected. If the victim wants to 
report the case, then either the on-site police desk or the nearest 
police station is contacted to come to the crisis centre to register 
the case, and to take charge of the documentation and evidence 
collection kits. In terms of National Department of Health (DOH) 
policy, no patient is turned away from a crisis centre, irrespective 
of whether they choose to report the case or not. A full medical 
and medico-legal examination is done with evidentiary collection, 
and PEP is provided in all cases, and as per standard DOH 
protocol.
Rape is a high-risk exposure for STI, including HIV and pregnancy. 
A standard DOH protocol is followed, and entails baseline blood 
testing (hepatitis, syphilis) and HIV testing. Analysis takes place 
in a laboratory, and results take up to 3 weeks to process. A 
urine pregnancy test is also performed and, if negative, post-
coital contraceptives are given, with an appointment for repeat 
pregnancy testing at 2- and 4-week intervals. Should the patient 
become pregnant, she will be offered termination in terms of the 
Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1996. Two HIV rapid 
tests are also done, with pre- and post-test counselling. This 
includes a buccal smear and a finger-prick blood-test strip for 
HIV. If the victim presents within 72 hours11,23,24 and both tests are 
negative, the victim is counselled, given antiretroviral treatment 
(ART) for 28 days, and is then given an appointment for HIV 
testing at 3 weeks, 6 weeks, 3 months and 6 months, as per 
DOH protocol.9 Should the patient test positive at presentation, 
the patient is counselled and given an appointment to visit the 
HIV clinic for initiation of ART. ART is generally well tolerated by 
patients, and most patients complete the 28-day course of tablets. 
All patients are given syndromic treatment, comprising antibiotics 
for STI. Ongoing counselling is ensured by an appointment with 
the psychology department of the hospital.
From the perspective of the victims, the primary concern relates to 
medical as opposed to legal issues. The alleged perpetrator could 
be in the ‘window period’, which could be as long as 3 weeks; a 
false-negative HIV result could influence the survivor’s choice and 
result in him or her declining ART, and this would have serious 
consequences for his/her health outcomes.
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Telephonic conversation with staff at Addington Hospital Crisis 
Centre revealed that only 3 requests were received under the Act 
in the first 8 months of this year. In all 3 cases, a formal HIV blood 
test was done and sent to Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital 
(IALCH), bearing an Addington Hospital case number – resulting 
in Addington Hospital bearing the costs of the test. Owing to the 
large amount of enzymatic HIV blood testing done at IALCH, the 
HIV results would only be available some 3 weeks after blood 
testing. This 3-week time delay would render such result irrelevant 
as far as the medical treatment of the victim is concerned. The 
staff at Addington Hospital Crisis Centre also stated that in all 3 
instances the HIV results were negative, and that these results 
were collected by the SAPS. The staff further stated that they were 
uncertain about how they would handle a positive result, as the 
provisions of the Act created an ethical dilemma for them in respect 
of the accused. There is an ethical duty for medical practitioners 
to provide post-test counselling, to enable the accused to access 
the ARV programme, and to further advise him or her on lifestyle 
changes.25 The accused under the Act do not enjoy the same 
standards of care as other patients. 
In addition, a positive HIV test result of the accused at day 90 
is not scientifically compelling evidence that he was HIV positive 
at the time the offence was committed, or that he infected the 
victim. The victim could have tested negative immediately after the 
offence, but she could also have been in the window period having 
already been infected prior to the assault. The other variable is that 
she could have seroconverted by contact with other HIV-positive 
partners during unprotected sex, after the assault. Even if the 
accused is found to be HIV positive, it will be very difficult to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that he infected the victim. 
In addition, present constraints in the criminal justice system and 
public health system would create a logistical nightmare in giving 
effect to this Act, and would devour already scarce human and 
financial resources in an exercise that would not influence the 
medical outcomes for the victim. IALCH has a 3-week turn-around 
time for HIV results, as it processes HIV blood samples from the 
entire province. There are acute resource constraints in respect of 
HIV testing. Would this Act be allowed to circumvent the processing 
of HIV results of acutely ill patients, who need urgent medical 
intervention, or will the applicants be obliged to take their place in 
the queue? If there are to be delays in accessing the HIV status of 
the accused, then one of the main objectives of the Act – affording 
the victim certainty relatively quickly – will be undermined.
Infringements on the rights of the 
alleged perpetrator
It is common cause that the forced disclosure provisions infringe 
a number of fundamental rights of the person accused. The 
nature of these rights is now analysed and it is determined 
whether infringements of such rights can be justified in terms of 
the limitation clause. While a number of rights may be indirectly 
affected, the rights most egregiously impacted upon are the rights 
to privacy,26 the right to freedom and security of person, and the 
right to remain silent and not to give incriminating evidence.27
One of the cardinal aspects of the right to privacy is what has been 
referred to as the right of ‘informational self-determination’.28 This 
aspect of the right refers to restricting the collection and disclosure 
of private or personal information. Clearly, the disclosure of personal 
information would also adversely affect the right to human dignity. In 
C v Minister of Correctional Services,29 the court held that drawing 
a blood sample from a prisoner for an HIV test without following 
the informed consent policy amounted to a violation of the right to 
privacy. Importantly, the court recognised that a positive test result 
may have devastating consequences for the person, and hence 
the absolute imperative for proper pre- and post-test counselling.29 
The coerced disclosure provisions of the Act abrogate the necessity 
for informed consent, before testing is conducted. In addition, no 
provision is made in the Act for either pre- or post-test counselling. 
The net effect is that the state may be informing an accused person 
that he is HIV positive, without providing any further assistance, even 
though prevailing medical opinion is that counselling intervention in 
these circumstances is imperative.
In Mistry,30 the CC had to consider whether the right to privacy 
was breached by a communication from one official to another. 
The court indicated that the following factors relating to the breach 
were relevant:
• Was the information obtained in an intrusive manner?
• Was it about intimate aspects of the applicant’s personal life?
• Did it involve data provided by the applicant for one purpose, 
but which were used for another purpose?
• Was it disclosed to persons from whom the applicant could 
reasonably expect the information to be withheld? 
Chapter 5 of the Act allows for the forced testing, irrespective 
of whether the alleged perpetrator consents to the testing. The 
taking of bodily specimens may not be excessively intrusive, but 
is nonetheless a violation of section 12(2) of the Constitution, 
which guarantees everyone the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity. From a practical perspective, it will be virtually impossible 
for the confidentiality of the report to be maintained once the 
information is disclosed to the victim, particularly if the finding is 
that the person accused is HIV positive. If the victim perceives that 
he or she has been infected with a life-threatening disease, it will 
be wholly unreasonable for the law to expect the victim in these 
circumstances to respect the right of privacy and confidentiality 
of the person accused. In effect, this law could make the HIV 
status of the accused, public knowledge. The intrusion is therefore 
significant and far reaching.31
A further objective of the forced disclosure is to enable the 
investigating officer to gather information with a view to using it 
as evidence in criminal proceedings. In effect, the person accused 
may, against their wishes, be ordered to allow two specimens to be 
taken which can subsequently lead to evidence that may be used 
against him or her.
The application of the limitation 
clause
If the forced disclosure provisions of the Act are challenged, the 
focus no doubt will be on whether the infringement of the rights 
of the accused is reasonable and justifiable in accordance with 
section 36 of the Constitution. 
Section 36 of the Constitution provides for the limitation of rights in 
the Bill of Rights, therefore no right is absolute.
S 36 states:
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‘ The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of 
law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable, and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into ac-
count all relevant factors, including:
a) the nature of the right;
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’
As the forced disclosure provisions of the Act infringe a number of 
rights of the accused, the disclosure will be unconstitutional unless 
the legislature can satisfy the requirements of the limitation clause. 
The Act is clearly a law of general application, and the question 
will be whether it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on dignity, equality and freedom. As the 
CC pointed out in S v Makwanyane,32 the limitation of constitutional 
rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in an open 
and democratic society, involves the weighing up of competing 
values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. 
Unlike the enquiry in respect of whether government is acting 
reasonably when progressively realising socio-economic rights, 
the courts assess whether the option chosen by government 
is proportionate and whether there are less restrictive options 
available. 
In S v Manamela, the court held that as a general rule, the 
more serious the impact of the measure on the right, the more 
persuasive or more compelling the justification must be. Further, 
it was held that the essence of the enquiry is to determine the 
proportionality ‘between the extent of the limitation of the right 
considering the nature and extent of the limitation of the infringed 
right on the one hand, and the purpose, importance and effect of 
the infringing provision, taking into account the availability of less 
restrictive means available to achieve that purpose’.33
The right in issue is a central aspect of the right to privacy, and 
includes the right not to have blood taken without consent, and 
the right not to have his or her HIV status made known to others. 
Weighed against this, is the right of the victim to know the HIV 
status of the accused. This knowledge will, no doubt, affect his or 
her physical and psychological health in various ways. However, 
the sanguine words of the CC in Dlamini34 are apposite here:
‘ One must be careful to ensure that the alarming level of crime 
is not used to justify extensive and inappropriate invasions of 
individual rights. It is well established that s 36 requires a court 
to counterpoise the purpose, effects and importance of the 
infringing legislation on the one hand against the nature and 
importance of the right limited on the other.’ 
The question, therefore, is whether the purpose the law seeks to 
achieve, justifies the infringement of the right not, for example, to 
have confidential medical information such as HIV status disclosed 
without consent.
In assessing this, the following three questions will be analysed:35
1. How invasive is the infringement of the rights of the accused?
2. How persuasive is the justification for the infringement?
3. Are less restrictive means available to promote the rights of the 
victim? 
The infringement on bodily integrity is limited, as blood taking for 
alcohol testing is routinely done under the Criminal Procedures 
Act, for the purposes of criminal prosecutions.36
It is submitted that the HIV status of the alleged perpetrator bears 
no practical relevance to the treatment of the survivor. Rape is a 
high-risk situation with regard to HIV, and current protocols state 
that a survivor must be given PEP within 72 hours of the incident, 
unless he or she tests HIV positive. The medical intervention makes 
provision for first-contact counselling and ongoing counselling by 
designated health and allied agencies.22 
The argument of empowering the survivor with knowledge of the 
accused’s HIV status is an emotionally charged one, and does not 
have any meaningful effect on therapeutic outcomes for the victim. 
The following is a useful analogy. If a rapist wore a condom at the 
time of the assault, would this information have any influence on 
the treatment of, or psychological outcomes for, the victim? The 
answer is a resounding NO. This use of a condom could provide 
a false sense of security, as the condom could have punctured 
during the rape. Save for evidentiary purposes, doctors disregard 
whether a condom was used or not, for therapeutic and treatment 
purposes.
The over-riding fact is that rape is a high-risk situation, and ART 
must be provided to the victim within 72 hours of the assault. 
Any time delay, even for the futile exercise of waiting for the HIV 
results of the accused by the victim, could have life-threatening 
consequences for the victim. 
Clearly, society must provide redress to victims. Providing PEP 
and effective counselling for victims, empathetic treatment by 
medical personnel and law enforcement officials in their hour of 
need, competent investigation by the police, and effective and 
efficient prosecutions, will bring a greater measure of relief to the 
victim than by forcing the accused to reveal his HIV status. It is 
submitted that the radical infringement of the accused’s rights 
is being used to make up for the shortcomings in the treatment 
of victims, and for the failures of the policing and prosecutorial 
services. It is highly unlikely that the forced disclosure provisions 
would be deemed to be a proportionate response, and it will, in our 
submission, be deemed unconstitutional.
In their submissions to the Portfolio Committee, the AIDS Law 
Project (ALP) emphasised that a small percentage of survivors will 
benefit from this law.37 They argued that more vulnerable groups of 
women and other victims of sexual assault are unlikely to benefit 
from this law, and identified the following groups who will not 
benefit:
• women who do not report rape and other forms of 
sexual assault, including women in coercive and abusive 
relationships who, for various reasons, do not define their 
experiences as rape
• women whose assailants are either not arrested, or are 
arrested outside of the statutory period 
• women who are already HIV positive
• women who have been subjected to gang or group rape, 
where not all the perpetrators are in custody.
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Furthermore, the ALP noted that it is unlikely that such legislation 
will benefit large numbers of male survivors of sexual assault. Most 
men who survive sexual assault do not report their experiences 
because of the high level of shame and stigma attached to these 
crimes, and will thus be unable to access the provisions of such 
legislation. It is also not clear whether such legislation will benefit 
men in prisons who are subject to repeated sexual violence, 
unless it is linked to measures to protect victims of sexual violence 
in prisons from further assault and they are able to access PEP 
and related services.37 
Even though the Act requires the decision of the magistrate to 
be made without undue delay, this is unlikely to occur. Prior to 
granting the order, the magistrate must be satisfied that there is 
prima facie evidence that a sexual offence had been committed 
against the victim by the alleged offender, that the victim may have 
been exposed to bodily fluids, and no more than 90 calendar days 
have lapsed since the date the alleged offence took place. It would 
be very difficult for the magistrate to come to this conclusion in an 
informal enquiry, in the face of a categorical denial by the accused. 
The magistrate would find it exceedingly difficult to determine 
conflicts of fact on affidavits, and may be obliged to resolve 
these disputes by allowing the parties to be cross-examined. The 
question that then arises is whether it is in the interests of the 
victim to be subject to a preliminary legal proceeding, and then 
again to the main criminal proceedings. Given the consequences 
of this order, it is very likely that the accused would vigorously 
resist these applications. The magistrate may therefore have to 
adopt an adversarial process to determine disputes of fact, and 
this could potentially be prejudicial to the victim and undermine 
important objectives of the Act. 
Challenges associated with the 
practical implementation of the Act
In order for the legislation to be effectively implemented, members 
of court staff, police and medical and nursing staff will have to 
undergo extensive training. Survivors sometimes find that the 
police – usually the first point of contact with the criminal justice 
system for rape victims – are often uninformed and unsympathetic.6 
Despite recent efforts to improve the system, a women complaining 
of rape may have no choice but to give a statement to an untrained 
and unsympathetic male officer, within hearing of others waiting 
for attention. There is also a danger that the Act may overburden 
an already burdened police service.
Secondary traumatisation would be exacerbated if the alleged 
perpetrator of the rape is now acquitted and wishes to issue a 
counter-charge against the complainant for maliciously making an 
application to ascertain the HIV status of the accused.38
The competence of staff who treat victims of sexual violence in 
the South African health sector has been questioned.6,7 Most of 
these health workers have little relevant training and see treatment 
for sexual violence as a minor part of their work, and so place 
little priority on learning from and discussing care with colleagues. 
They also inadequately manage clinical signs such as STIs. The 
provision of care has been largely developed in response to police 
and prosecutorial requirements, with the consequence that the 
physical and psychological health needs of the victim receive 
substantially less attention than medico-legal evidentiary issues.4 
Hence, the health services should give precedence to the medical 
needs of the victim. This should include immediate and long-term 
psychological support, pregnancy prevention, STI treatment, 
and HIV counselling and treatment. Access to proficient medico-
legal examinations to gather evidence for the prosecution of the 
accused should also be included.
In short, health workers in South Africa need specialised training in 
their management of victims of sexual assault.4
Section 7 of the National Health Act 61 of 200339 provides that 
health services may not be provided without the informed consent 
of the user, and section 14 demands confidentiality in respect of 
records.19 However, these sections are subject to the override of a 
court order. The dilemma that may confront medical practitioners 
is that the court order compelling forced disclosure may, from the 
perspective of their medical judgment, be unsound and unethical. 
Even if they are of this view, they will be obliged to implement the 
terms of the order of the court. 
The Magistrates Court presently has a demanding workload 
and faces huge backlogs. The administration of the courts has 
budgetary and personnel constraints. The crime figures are 
daunting. In 2009/10, the SAPS had to deal with 815 280 reported 
cases of serious crime, including 68 332 reported rape cases.2 
Language barriers have also been cited as a factor needing 
attention, so as to give full effect to this Bill.40 
Conclusion
The Act aims to assist women who have been raped, as a 
vulnerable group, by enabling them to make decisions regarding 
their medical care, after having knowledge of the HIV status of the 
accused.
As argued, the forced disclosure provisions of the Act constitute 
a serious infringement of the various constitutional rights of 
the accused. The benefits that accrue to the victim are largely 
illusory, as the information plays no meaningful role in the 
treatment provided. Providing PEP and supportive measures 
within the prescribed time period of 72 hours occurs irrespective 
of knowledge of the HIV status of the accused. Ascertaining the 
status may in some instances induce a false sense of security, 
which could result in erroneous choices being made by the victim, 
which could then have dire health implications. The Act has the 
potential to burden an already overstretched public health care 
and justice system. Similarly, this law seeks to provide a simplistic 
solution that will not be in the long-term interests of Society. If we 
are genuinely concerned about the interests of the victims, then 
the solution lies in ensuring that state agencies serve them better.
What should ultimately be remembered is that HIV is an infectious 
disease. Every single person who is accused of sexually 
transmitting the virus by whatever means will at some point have 
been the victim of a ‘transmitter’ themselves. Replication and 
infection is the primary objective of any virus. The real criminal is 
perhaps not the human host, therefore, but HIV itself.
It is our submission that the law forcing disclosure of the accused’s 
HIV status, is undesirable from a medical perspective, and the benefits 
do not outweigh the egregious infringements of constitutional rights. 
Furthermore, the forced disclosure of HIV status is disproportionate, 
unreasonable and inconsistent with the Constitution.
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